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THE LEGACY OF MAGNA CARTA: LAW AND JUSTICE
IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
Anthony Musson*

INTRODUCTION
Scholarly focus on Magna Carta in the fourteenth century has generally been on
what might be termed the public law or constitutional aspects. The Great Charter
was frequently invoked in the political discourse of the time and became enshrined in
the lexicon of constitutional debate between the king and his subjects.1 Magna Carta’s
prominence in the fourteenth century owed much to its confirmation during the 1297
constitutional crisis,2 which brought formal assimilation as part of the common law (la
grande chartre des franchises cume lay commune), an event that revived and refocused
the attention of the legal profession.3 With historical hindsight, though, it was the confirmation of Magna Carta as a point of principle in the so-called ‘six statutes’ (“fourteenth-century interpretations of the Magna Carta”)4 and its employment in the ‘Record
and Process’ against Richard II—the official parliamentary justification for his deposition in 13995 that firmly embedded the Great Charter in legal and political theory.6
* The author is grateful to the delegates at the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal’s
2016 Symposium and to Professor Mark Ormrod for comments on the text.
1
For example, the final clause of the Ordinances of 1311 (restraining Edward II) required Magna Carta to be upheld in all its points. CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES: 1 CHRONICLES OF THE REIGNS OF EDWARD I.
AND EDWARD II. 173–74 (Stubbs ed., Kraus Reprint 1965) (1882) [hereinafter CHRONICLES
OF EDWARD I AND II]. But in 1312 Edward II argued (through his legal advisers) against the
validity of the Ordinances on the grounds that they contravened Magna Carta, the Forest Charter,
and his coronation oath. Id. at 211–15; SEYMOUR PHILLIPS, EDWARD II 198–99 (2010).
2
MICHAEL PRESTWICH, EDWARD I, at 427–35, 519–27 (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (1988).
3
See Charles Howard McIlwain, Magna Carta and the Common Law, in MAGNA CARTA
COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 122, 122–23 (Henry Elliot Malden ed., 2005) (1917); 132 SELDEN
SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS AND COMMENTARIES ON MAGNA CARTA: 1400–1604, at xxxix–
xl (John Baker ed., 2015) [hereinafter READINGS AND COMMENTARIES].
4
FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300–1629, at 86–87 (1948).
5
See DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 62–67 (2015) (giving an original and translated copy of chapter 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta providing that twenty-five individuals shall
oversee the realm to keep the peace and liberties provided by the Magna Carta); Andrew
Spencer, The Coronation Oath in English Politics, 1217–1399, in POLITICAL SOCIETY IN
LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: A FESTSCHRIFT FOR CHRISTINE CARPENTER 33, 43 (Benjamin
Thompson & John Watts eds., 2015) (discussing the “Record and Process” of King Richard
II’s deposition depicting many failures to uphold the Magna Carta).
6
See GERALD HARRISS, SHAPING THE NATION: ENGLAND 1360–1461, at 492–93 (2005);
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This revisitation of Magna Carta’s legacy will focus not on the high politics of
the period, but on what might anachronistically be called the realms of private law:
the disputes of the highly litigious population of the age.7 The Article explores the
continued relevance of the Great Charter by considering the nature of its invocation
in the litigation strategies of individuals and communities alike.8 In so doing, it examines perceptions of its authority and the legitimacy that stemmed from citing
Magna Carta (or its tenets).9 It also assesses the role of the legal profession in
interpreting and pushing the conceptual boundaries of the Great Charter during this
period.10 Finally, it considers the extent to which the language and rhetoric of petitions reflects expectations of the Great Charter as a benchmark for the exercise of
royal justice.11
I. AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY
Taking on the mantle of the preeminent statute of the realm, Magna Carta was symbolically placed at the head of the legislative canon in contemporary collections of
statutes.12 Produced from the late thirteenth century onwards, initially as rolls and
then in book form, these bespoke volumes often included other legal material useful
to practitioners, such as treatises and/or registers of writs.13 In general, though,
Magna Carta and the Forest Charter provided an initial reference point preceding the
legislation promulgated by Henry III and Edward I,14 which was the meat and drink
of practising lawyers. Late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century copyists also included Magna Carta in manuscript collections of earlier legal texts,15 intending it either
as the apotheosis of a tradition of early English laws (that included the Anglo-Saxon
J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 34–48 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2015); THOMPSON, supra
note 4, at 86–97, 326–35.
7
This is an area Thompson recognised as largely ignored by historians in favour of the
public side. THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 33.
8
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part I.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See Don C. Skemer, From Archives to the Book Trade: Private Statute Rolls in England,
1285–1307, 16 J. SOC’Y ARCHIVISTS 193, 195 (1995) (writing of statute rolls in the fourteenth century consistently containing Magna Carta) [hereinafter Book Trade].
13
Don C. Skemer, Reading the Law: Statute Books and the Private Transmission of
Legal Knowledge in Late Medieval England, in LEARNING THE LAW: TEACHING AND THE
TRANSMISSION OF LAW IN ENGLAND 1150–1900, at 113, 116–17 (Jonathan A. Bush & Alain
Wijffles eds., 1999) [hereinafter Reading the Law].
14
See generally Book Trade, supra note 12 (discussing in part the role Magna Carta took
in fourteenth-century legal texts).
15
See generally Reading the Law, supra note 13 (describing the formation of various
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century legal texts that included the Magna Carta).
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Consilatio Cnuti16 and the Leges Edwardi17 as well as the late twelfth-century
treatise, Glanvill18) or, in an attempt to provide continuity from the legal past, as a
worthy extension of that tradition.19
Not surprisingly it played an important part, too, in legal education. Although
the earliest extant lectures so far identified cover the first clause of the second Statute
of Westminster (De donis),20 surviving moot questions—problems drawn from particular statutes—indicate that disputation on areas of law espoused by the Great
Charter was a theme favoured by lawyers,21 probably members of the emergent Inns
of Court, as early as the 1340s.22 Indeed, the questions forming one of the learning
exercises contains the names of those who posed them or interjected during the
moot: lawyers (such as Roger de Baukwell, Richard Branscombe, William Fyncheden,
John Knyvett, and John Pulteney) who were in practice during this period.23 The
moot questions recorded were probably distilled or abridged from some other text,
but the earliest two surviving manuscripts (both at Cambridge) show that the statute
book formed the basis for these exercises24 and that the interpretation of at least
seventeen clauses of Magna Carta (clauses 3–5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 18, 21, 22, 28, 29, 31,
33, 34, 36, 37)25 was debated before the earliest ‘Readings’ (lectures) on the subject
were held in the Inns of Court in the early fifteenth century.26
Although the recorded Magna Carta moot problems do not appear to derive
explicitly from the Year Book reports of cases appearing in the courts, its manifestation in the latter equally demonstrates the significance of the Great Charter in litigation as well as revealing the particular matters of dispute in the courts.27 Cases from
16

Scott Kleinman, Frid and Fredom: Royal Forests and the English Jurisprudence of
La(mon’s Brut and Its Readers, 109 MOD. PHILOLOGY 17, 24 (2011).
17
BRUCE R. O’BRIEN, GOD’S PEACE & KING’S PEACE: THE LAWS OF EDWARD THE
CONFESSOR 3 (1999).
18
See generally THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL (G. D. G. Hall ed. & trans., 1983).
19
For example, see London, British Library [hereinafter BL] MS Harley 746, 1704; BL
MS Additional 24066; Bruce O’Brien, Pre-Conquest Laws and Legislators in the Twelfth
Century, in THE LONG TWELFTH-CENTURY VIEW OF THE ANGLO-SAXON PAST 229, 233–34
(M. Brett & D. A. Woodman eds., 2015).
20
Paul Brand, Legal Education in England Before the Inns of Court, in LEARNING THE
LAW: TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF ENGLISH LAW 51, 66 (Jonathan Bush & Alain
A. Wijffels eds., 1999).
21
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at xl; see also 2 READINGS AND MOOTS
AT THE INNS OF COURT IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY: MOOTS AND READERS’ CASES (Samuel
E. Thorne & J.H. Baker eds., 1990), in 105 SELDEN SOCIETY cxlii–cxliii [hereinafter READINGS
AND MOOTS] (providing a selection of Magna Carta cases).
22
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at xl.
23
READINGS AND MOOTS, supra note 21, at xxiii–xxiv.
24
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at xl.
25
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
26
READINGS AND MOOTS, supra note 21, at xxii–xxv, xlv–xlvi, cxliii–cxlvii; see also
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 3, at xl.
27
READINGS AND MOOTS, supra note 21, at xix, xxi.
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the early fourteenth century concerning interpretation of individual provisions not only
show in the range of clauses litigated a remarkable affinity with the clauses highlighted in the surviving moots, but also how provisions of Magna Carta (whether
taken as separate issues or joined with elements from other statutes) provided legal
points on which lawyers felt their colleagues needed to be informed and advised.28
Dissemination and discussion of Magna Carta’s provisions was not restricted
to the legal profession nor indeed to the literate, public proclamation enabled it to
reach a broader audience.29 Emphasis on its accessibility, if not applicability to all,
was envisaged by the Articuli Super Cartas according to which transcripts of the
Great Charter were to be sent to sheriffs so it could be read out ‘before the people
four times a year’ at Michaelmas, Christmas, Easter, and Midsummer.30 Regular
recitation of Magna Carta in the county court, the shire’s prime meeting point,
combined with recitation of the Statute of Winchester of 1285 (measures for local
policing),31 afforded attendees in the localities a firm basis of the key tenets in the
English judicial system.32 Following parliamentary assent, new legislation—some
of it citing or endorsing Magna Carta—was also proclaimed in towns and cities, at
fairs and markets, and in the countryside at important crossroads.33
The language of dissemination and proclamation equally assisted its absorption.34
The Great Charter was originally issued to the barons in Anglo-Norman French, as
a contemporary 1215 version implies.35 Other copies in the vernacular French were
circulated during the thirteenth century through their inclusion in chronicles, cartularies,
and legal collections.36 We know from chronicles and the instructions sent out to
28

See, e.g., David J. Seipp, Medieval English Legal History: An Index and Paraphrase of
Printed Year Book Reports, 1268–1535: Compiled by David J. Seipp (Seipp’s Abridgement),
LEGAL HISTORY: THE YEAR BOOKS, https://www.bu.edu/law/faculty-scholarship/legal-history
-the-year-books/ [http://perma.cc/X9D2-H8QE]. c.1—liberties of holy church (1330.193ss),
c.3—waste during wardship (1329.084; 1352.023), c.4—custody of lands in wardship
(1310.048ss), c.7—widow’s remarriage (1311.255ss, 1311.258ss), c.11—common pleas
(1310.168ss), c.12—assizes (1313.594ss; 1324.018), c.18—debt of the deceased (1308.026ss;
1311.295ss, 1324.062), c.24—praecipe (1302.150rs), c.28—witnesses for an oath (1304.179rs,
1313.440ss, 1324.187), c.35—county courts (1330.193ss), c.36—gifts to religious houses
(1306.033rs).
29
Reginald L. Poole, The Publication of Great Charters by the English Kings, 28 ENG.
HIST. REV. 444, 449 (1913).
30
1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 136 (Alexander Luders et al. eds., 1808–28).
31
See SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (George Burton
Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., 1927) (1901).
32
J. R. Maddicott, The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion in FourteenthCentury England, 28 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 27, 32–35 (1987).
33
Id. at 33–36.
34
Id. at 36.
35
HOLT, supra note 6, at 399.
36
Bibliothèque Municipale de Rouen, MS y 200 is the only known vernacular French
copy of the 1215 Magna Carta in existence. It was written in a thirteenth-century hand and

2016]

THE LEGACY OF MAGNA CARTA

633

sheriffs that Magna Carta and other statutes were not read out solely in Latin
(litteraliter),37 a French text was prepared for recitation,38 but they were also translated by the crier himself and proclaimed (in the local dialect) for the benefit of
people for whom English was their native (patria lingua) or mother tongue (materna
lingua).39 This linguistic inclusivity was deemed appropriate for ensuring it reached
the widest possible audience.
The broad reach of Magna Carta and perceptions of its authority can be observed by studying the prime vehicle for the transmission of grievances or requests
for remedy of complaints to the crown: the petition. Explicit evidence of the identity
of the compilers of petitions or recourse to legal advice by petitioners is sometimes
discernible, but fairly rare.40 In 1290, for example, it emerged from an inquiry into
disputed facts about a petition that local scribe Stephen le Popeshall of Kent had
written it for four pence,41 while in clause 1393 Joan, daughter of Alice Windsor (or
Alice Perrers, as is she is more familiarly known),42 stated in her petition that ‘sages
de loy’ informed her that her claim had the merits of ‘droit et reson.’43
It is clear from a survey of private petitions submitted to parliament for the
king’s attention, that Magna Carta was invoked in different ways and with varying
degrees of accuracy and success by a range of individuals and groups from across
included in the cartulary of the Leper Hospital of St. Giles at Pont-Audemer, Normandy. It
clearly states that the vernacular document and writ that followed were attested in Odiham,
27 June 1215 MS y 200. Id. For later examples in Anglo-Norman French see, for example,
BL MS Additional 32085.
37
HOLT, supra note 6, at 399.
38
Id.
39
CAMDEN SOCIETY, THE CHRONICLE OF WILLIAM DE RISHANGER OF THE BARON’S WARS:
THE MIRACLES OF SIMON DE MONTFORT 405 (James Orchard Halliwell ed., 1968) (1840); 5
CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES:
ANNALES MONASTICI 541 (Henry Richards Luard ed., 1869); MICHAEL CLANCHY, FROM
MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066–1307, at 267–68 (2013); James A. Doig,
Political Propaganda and Royal Proclamations in Late Medieval England, 71 HIST. RES.
253, 264 (1998).
40
GWILYM DODD, JUSTICE AND GRACE: PRIVATE PETITIONING AND THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 302–04, 312 (2007). See generally Kitrina Lindsay
Bevan, Clerks and Scriveners: Legal Literacy and Access to Justice in Late Medieval
England (Mar. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter) (on file with Open
Research Exeter, University of Exeter).
41
Paul Brand, Petitions and Parliament in the Reign of Edward I, in 23 PARLIAMENTARY
HIST. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2004), reprinted in PARCHMENT AND PEOPLE: PARLIAMENT IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 14, 30–31 (Linda Clark ed., 2004).
42
This made her the illegitimate daughter of Edward III. See generally W. M. Ormrod,
The Trials of Alice Perrers, 83 SPECULUM 366 (2008).
43
Petitioners: Joan Wyndesor (Windsor), Daughter of Alice Windsor (SC 8/22/1060)
(c.1393/1394), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061224
[http://perma.cc/6WJP-2CKC].

634

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:629

the social scale, clergy as well as lay persons.44 For some, it seemed enough to allude to la tenur de la grant chartre on the basis of the substance of the request (e.g.,
a widow seeking financial support from her husband’s executors),45 or for the petitioner to ask to receive their inheritance in full ‘as ordained by the Great Charter.’46
For others it was necessary to raise it in order to avoid disinheritance, which would
be ‘against the terms of Magna Carta.’47 One early fourteenth-century petitioner,
Thomas de Fynmer, did not reference Magna Carta by name, but accorded it a legislative basis when he stated that it was ordained by statute that no man be ousted
from his free tenement.48
More often than not the knowledge of the drafter or the nature of the advice
given has to be inferred from the style and details of the petition itself, especially its
legal complexity and the particular circumstances surrounding it.49 In the case of
John Wardeden of Bodiam (Sussex) and John de Boxhurst of Sandhurst (Kent) the text
of the petition paraphrases clause 29,50 but in such a way that it retains its legal flavour:
“that by him [the king?] or by the common law the body of no one ought to be taken
nor their lands nor chattels removed into the king’s hand unless it is for just cause.”51
44

See generally DODD, supra note 40, at 279–316 (discussing the drafting of petitions
in varying ways, including the language and authorship of the petitions).
45
Petitioners: Alice de Everingham, Widow of Thomas de Normanville (SC 8/312/E1)
(c.1395), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9529050
[http://perma.cc/A7KR-KMYG].
46
Petitioners: William de la Beche (Beech); Euphemia de la Beche, Wife of William de
la Beech, one of the Heirs of Edmund Comyn of Kilbride; Harvey de Stanton (Staunton),
Guardian of Mary, Sister of Euphemia, the Other Heir (SC 8/95/4733) (1322), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9149284 [http://perma.cc/83MD
-Y7YC].
47
Petitioners: Richard de Grey Codnor (SC 8/48/2400) (c.1330), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062613 [http://perma.cc/3PXP-NSAK].
48
Petitioners: Thomas de Fynmer (SC 8/206/10292) (c.1332), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9333848 [http://perma.cc/2HKU-ZHKD] (come
ordeyne est par lestatut qu nulla homme soit ouste de son frank tenement saunz estre mys a
responus).
49
See generally Gwilym Dodd, Writing Wrongs: The Drafting of Supplications to the
Crown in Later Fourteenth-Century England, 80.2 MEDIUM AEVUM 217 (2011) (analyzing
the different influences that affected petitions, and the various specialized knowledge and
expertise used) [hereinafter Writing Wrongs].
50
See MAGNA CARTA (1225).
51
Petitioners: John Wardeden, Son of Richard Wardeden of Bodiam; John de Boxhurst
of Sandhurst (SC 8/15/749) (1346), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov
.uk/details/r/C9060890 [http://perma.cc/5DAQ-T6KY] (qe par la ou par la comune ley le
corps de nulli ne doit estre pris ne ses terres ne ses chateux seisez en la mein le Roi sil ne
soit par veroy cause). This petition also appears in the old edition of the rolls of parliament
where it is dated c.1330. 2 ROLLS OF PARLIAMENT: REIGN OF EDWARD III, at 3 (1783). This
does not fit with a writ issued in 1346. 8 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS: EDWARD III A.D.
1346–1349, at 154 (1905).
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Petitioners (or their advisors) may have considered direct quotation from the
Great Charter was a way of underlining its authority and thus the legitimacy of the
claim. A petition from Robert de Thorpe of Suffolk, for instance, desiring ‘such
remedy as afforded by the law of the land and the provisions of the Great Charter,’
referred accordingly to several distinct ‘poyntz’ of the Charter during the course of
his lengthy petition.52 Robert Thorpe was son and heir of John Thorpe (d.1324), who
had held the manor of Combs in Suffolk directly from the king for an annual fee
farm, which had escheated to the king as a result of a forfeiture in the distant past.53
The petitioner was claiming reimbursement of the issues erroneously taken by the
escheator and remedy for the sheriff’s wrongful distraint for payment of relief.54 In
support of his case, Thorpe quotes directly from clause 31 of Magna Carta (1225)55
“we will hold it in the same manner that the baron held it,”56 for which unusually the
text breaks from the Anglo-Norman French of the petition into Latin “Nos eodem
modo eam tenebimus quo baro eam tenuit etc.”57 By making precise reference to the
original Latin text, Thorpe is emphasising both his specific claim and his understanding of the authority of the Charter. Since unfortunately he had mistakenly ‘through
ignorance’) already performed homage to the king,58 the strength of his argument
through invocation of that particular clause may have been undermined. Hedging
his bets slightly in legal terms, therefore, he then cites the clause at the very end of
the Charter: “Also we have granted to them for us and our heirs, that neither we nor
our heirs shall seek anything by which the liberties contained in this charter may be
infringed or broken; and if anything shall be sought after by any person contrary to
this it shall not prevail and be held for nothing.”59 The strategy succeeded to the extent
that the certifications and inquests he had attached to the petition were scrutinised
in chancery and the complaint itself was eventually ordered to be heard by the king’s
council.60 In the meantime, though, as Robert Thorpe died in April 1330,61 it took
Sir John de Clavering, who held the wardship of Thorpe’s heir, to bring the case to
52

Petitioners: Robert de Thorp (Thorpe), Son and Heir of John de Thorp (SC 8/166/8297)
(1325), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9294142 [http://
perma.cc/CK99-BYXH] (tiel remedie qu la ley de la terre et les poyntz de la graunde Chartre).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
57
Petitioners: Robert de Thorp (Thorpe), Son of John de Thorpe (SC 8/8/355) (1325),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060478 [http://perma
.cc/C37Z-K3DR] (a duplicate of the petition supra note 52).
58
SC 8/166/8297, supra note 52.
59
See MAGNA CARTA (1225).
60
SC 8/166/8297, supra note 52; SC 8/8/355, supra note 57.
61
W. A. COPINGER, THE MANORS OF SUFFOLK: NOTES ON THEIR HISTORY AND DEVOLUTION 151 (1910).
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the attention of the king in parliament. He did so in July of that year, whereupon the
matter was examined by the chancellor, treasurer, the justices of the two benches,
barons of the exchequer and other wise men of the council, who duly acknowledged:
that it is specified in the great charter that the king will not have
wardship by reason of escheat if a man held in chief of someone
other than him, that it is the case that the aforesaid Robert held
the same moiety at the fee-farm from the king . . . and thereby
the king ought not to have the wardship of the manors . . . by
reason of the minority of the heir of the said Robert.62
Precise citations such as this appear to betray the influence of lawyers or at least
personal reference to a statute book. Indeed, volumes of statutes were owned not just
by men of law, but a whole range of ‘consumers’ of legal literature, among whom
were public officials, lay landowners, merchants, estate stewards, ecclesiastical institutions, and urban corporations.63 As Robert de Thorpe’s father played a key role in
local justice in East Anglia during Edward II’s reign,64 the petitioner may well have
had access to a copy of the Great Charter in any law books he possessed or been able
to secure legal advice on the matter. Equally, he would have had access to the sheriff’s office where copies of the Great Charter and other legislation were deposited.65
It would therefore be unsurprising to find Thorpe’s verbatim citation, though that in
itself does not diminish the authoritativeness of the claim or the air of confidence he
wished to project by its use.
The clergy’s invocation of Magna Carta and the substance of particular clauses
may reflect both the growing practice of ecclesiastical institutions retaining common
lawyers during the fourteenth century, and their personal or institutional possession
of statute books or transcripts of the Great Charter.66 As Richard Helmholz has
62

Parliament of November 1330, C 65/2 m6d, in PARLIAMENT ROLLS OF MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND (Chris Given-Wilson et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter PROME]; Petitioners: Robert
de Thorp (Thorpe), Son and Heir of John de Thorp (SC 8/266/13299) (c.1330), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517246 [http://perma.cc/5HRN
-U5MW].
63
ANTHONY MUSSON, MEDIEVAL LAW IN CONTEXT: THE GROWTH OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE PEASANTS’ REVOLT 122–23 (2001); Donald C.
Skemer, Sir William Breton’s Book: Production of Statuta Angliae in the Late Thirteenth
Century, in ENGLISH MANUSCRIPT STUDIES, 1100–1700, at vii, 27–28 (Peter Beal & Jeremy
Griffiths eds., 1998). Skemer provides the contents and organizational scheme for Breton’s
statute collection. Id. at 38–42.
64
ANTHONY MUSSON & W. M. ORMROD, THE EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH JUSTICE: LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 70 (1999) [hereinafter THE EVOLUTION
OF ENGLISH JUSTICE].
65
Maddicott, supra note 32, at 36–37.
66
Adelaide Bennett, Anthony Bek’s Copy of Statuta Angliae, in ENGLAND IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1985 HARLAXTON SYMPOSIUM 18–21 (W. M.
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shown, however, the clergy were generally enthusiastic about disseminating the
provisions of the Great Charter and it was not only read out in Cathedrals, but also
included in clergy manuals.67 Unlike Robert Thorpe, however, some of their petitions tend to paraphrase rather than provide the text verbatim.68 Citing the Great
Charter (but not a specific clause), the bishop of Rochester’s claim, for example,
related to waste during the recent vacancy in the Holy See (clause 4)69 in that he
alleged waste made to the woods and mismanagement of the estate.70 The prior of
Cranborne framed his grievance in relation to clause 14,71 complaining that contrary
to ‘la graunt chartre’ he had been ammerced to the tune of £10 when his lay fee
amounted only to two acres of land.72 In his request for restoration of various spiritual
rights,73 which he argues were wrongfully taken from the churches of Penrith and
Dalston by the keeper of the temporalities of the see of Carlisle, the archbishop of York,
William Melton, does not invoke the Great Charter by name.74 Nevertheless he effectively provides clause 175 as a justification for action (contre le gree le dit Ercevesque
e contre le dite fraunchise de seinte Eglise).76 The broadness of this clause, however,
belies the fact that the substance of his complaint in fact involves elements of several
other provisions of Magna Carta, namely clause 4 and clause 33.77
Bishops and priors certainly had recourse to legal advice and/or the text of the
Great Charter,78 but interestingly from the format of their petitions, lower clergy did
too.79 The parsons and vicars of the forest of Galtres (in the north riding of York
Ormrod ed., 1986); Maddicott, supra note 32, at 36; Nigel Ramsay, Retained Legal Counsel,
c.1275–c.1475, 35 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 95, 100–01, 103 (1985).
67
See generally R.H. Helmholz, The Church and Magna Carta, 25 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 425 (2016).
68
See Petitioners: Hamo Hethe, Bishop of Rochester (SC 8/87/4311) (c.1320), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9148853 [http://perma.cc/AYA6
-SGPX].
69
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
70
SC 8/87/4311, supra note 68.
71
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
72
Petitioners: Prior of Cranborne (SC 8/323/E554) (c.1295–1320), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9529606 [http://perma.cc/WKK5-7CAZ].
73
Including tithes of wool and lambs, mortuary gifts, offerings, pensions, and other revenues. Petitioners: William Melton Archbishop of York (SC 8/8/377) (1325), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060501 [http://perma.cc/Q7C4-EEBV].
74
See id.
75
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
76
See SC 8/8/377, supra note 73.
77
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
78
See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
79
See Petitioners: Hugh de Cressy, Parson of Greasley (SC 8/329/E967) (c.1295–c. 1310),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9682962 [http://perma
.cc/KM7Z-M6MG]; Petitioners: Hugh de Cressi (Cressy), Parson of the Church of Greasley
(SC 8/99/4932) (c.1300–c.1325), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov

638

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:629

shire) state that Magna Carta granted that puture should not be demanded from
people of the Church by forest officials because they had no land except the glebe
of the church, couching their grievance in terms as if the Great Charter (clause 14)80
used those precise words rather than by analogy.81 Hugh de Cressy, parson of the
church of Our Lady, Greasley in Nottinghamshire petitioned the king on two occasions concerning his right to tithes in Willey Hay.82 In complaining that they have
been granted away to someone else, he invokes the dispossession and disinheritance
aspects of clause 29 (desherite de sa possession),83 which he combines with clause
1 (a droit de sa eglise e a sa longe possession)84 and with his rights in relation to
assarts under the forest charter (clause 4).85
The status of the petitioners can equally imply recourse to legal assistance, and
the framing of complaints from peasants is particularly intriguing in its employment
of a discourse of ancient rights. Common perception of the downward extension of
Magna Carta’s provisions in this respect can be found in numerous petitions emanating from villagers invoking their real or imagined status as tenants of manors of the
king’s ancient demesne.86 Tenants on manors that were or had once been royal land
were accorded a range of special privileges, including protection from increases in
rents and services owed, access to the royal courts,87 and personal freedom.88 For
example, the ancient demesne tenants of South Tawton, who in early Edward II’s
reign sought confirmation of their customs and usages, were able to cite with appropriate detail that they were enrolled (en roule) as a result of a plea decided before oyer
and terminer justices Ralph de Hengham and his companions during Edward I’s
reign.89 This action had been brought when the manor was in the hands of Richard
.uk/details/r/C9149499 [http://perma.cc/R45A-848T]; Petitioners: Parsons and Vicars of the
Forest of Galtres (SC 8/11/532) (1333), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/details/r/C9060659 [http://perma.cc/52QE-RVMV].
80
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
81
SC 8/11/532, supra note 79.
82
SC 8/329/E967, supra note 79; SC 8/99/4932, supra note 79.
83
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
84
Id.
85
SC 8/329/E967, supra note 79; SC 8/99/4932, supra note 79.
86
See B. P. WOLFFE, THE ROYAL DEMESNE IN ENGLISH HISTORY: THE CROWN ESTATE
IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE REALM FROM THE CONQUEST TO 1509, at 29 (1971).
87
R. S. Hoyt, The Nature and Origins of Ancient Demesne, 65 ENG. HIST. REV. 145, 165,
168, 172 (1950); Marjorie Keniston McIntosh, The Privileged Villeins of the English Ancient
Demesne, 7 VIATOR: MEDIEVAL & RENAISSANCE STUD. 295, 296, 306–07 (1976).
88
Christopher Dyer, Memories of Freedom: Attitudes Towards Serfdom in England,
1200–1350, in SERFDOM AND SLAVERY STUDIES IN LEGAL BONDAGE 277, 286 (M. L. Bush
ed., 1996).
89
Petitioners: Tenants of the King’s Ancient Demesne of South Tawton (SC 8/142/7093)
(c.1307), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9209272 [http://
perma.cc/9J6W-K6V7].
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de Pultemor on account of ‘autres coustoums’ demanded of them.90 The second limb
of their petition highlighted further problems they had allegedly encountered, complaining of the unreasonable behaviour of royal bailiffs in detaining livestock and
wrongful distraints carried out by various lords that were interfering with their customary practices.91 Employing legal terminology to convey the bailiffs’ actions (par
force e destresce), they were clearly advised on the construction of their petition.92
Justification for bringing their complaint (akin to the tenants of Bocking, who were
under the jurisdiction of the prior’s Court Leet)93 came from the fact that the lords
were claiming royal privilege and other liberties (plede regal e autre franchises).94
The tenants of the ancient demesne manor of Fawsley similarly do not cite Magna
Carta by name, but emphasise their impoverishment (sont en poveris) through the
severity of the demands made on them contrary to the practices established in the
time of their forebears.95 Adding to the picture of injustice, they complain that they
have suffered ejection from their common pasture by the lord of the manor, Simon
de Daventry.96
Claims of dispossession made by other ancient demesne tenants seem to draw
implicitly on clause 29 of Magna Carta,97 championing their free status. Using the
language of disseisin, “poor tenants” variously maintain they have been ousted from
their land98 and their inheritance99 or had their houses knocked down and their lands
seized so that their heirs could not enjoy them.100
Although the petitions are brought at different periods, they tend to use similar
language and arguments. As justification for their position, they usually underline
90

Id. (The writ they obtained mentions “alias consuetudines et alias servicia”).
Id.
92
See id.
93
See John F. Nichols, An Early Fourteenth Century Petition from the Tenants of
Bocking to Their Manorial Lord, 2 ECON. HIST. REV. 300, 300–01 (1930).
94
SC 8/142/7093, supra note 89.
95
Petitioners: Tenants of the Ancient Demesne of the Manor of Fawsley (SC 8/169/8406)
(1315), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9294253 [http://
perma.cc/GE8Y-AMAB].
96
Id. As in the previous case, the arguments clearly struck the correct note with the
king’s council as a remedy was forthcoming. CALENDAR OF CHANCERY WARRANTS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE: A.D. 1244–1326, at 420 (1927).
97
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
98
See Petitioners: People of Old Windsor, New Windsor and Sunninghill of the Ancient
Demesne of the Crown (SC 8/201/10005) (c.1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.na
tionalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9333561 [http://perma.cc/NE2K-3BG3].
99
See Petitioners: Tenants of the Ancient Demesne of the Manor of Merton (SC 8/61/3007)
(1348), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9106768 [http://
perma.cc/MAZ5-P5BL].
100
See Petitioners: People of Ogbourne (SC 8/63/3133) (1332–1334), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9106896 [http://perma.cc/7MAW-LHQP].
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the antiquity of their customs and usages.101 Some cite Domesday Book,102 while one
group specifically cites King Harold, thus claiming its authority dated back prior to
the Conquest.103 Others simply state that they and their ancestors have enjoyed their
lands saunz destourbance from time immemorial.104 This could be taken in legal
terms to mean they were invoking the limit of legal memory (1189), a fictional time
by which matters of ownership, possession and usage were (and still are) theoretically judged.105 Alternatively, they were perhaps using the term more metaphorically
as simply constituting tradition or usage over a very long time.
The appeal to ancient customs lies at the heart of Magna Carta (especially clause
9),106 but the peasants also strongly believed that the actions against them were
“contrary to their laws” and prevented them from availing themselves of “droit.”107
Certain tenants also clearly believed that their personal liberty (as well as their lands
and possessions) was at stake: the tenants of Merton, for example, requested protection for their bodies and chattels.108 Such petitions provide an insight into perceptions
of liberty and the grounds upon which claims of unjust treatment were founded. The
perceptions of rights and privileges entertained by these disparate groups on a localised basis chimes with the belief of the townspeople and peasants of St. Alban’s,
who in a dispute in 1327 (and later during the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381) pointed the
abbot of St. Alban’s to various “charters of liberties” that they believed guaranteed
their freedoms.109
The petitions from ancient demesne tenants manifest concern for the misuse of
jurisdictional authority, thereby challenging the legitimacy of that authority.110 As
101

See, e.g., SC 8/201/10005, supra note 98.
Petitioners: King’s Poor Tenants of Archenfield (SC 8/167/8334) (1334), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9294179 [http://perma.cc/AHP6
-9H2H]; SC 8/61/3007, supra note 99; Petitioners: Keeper and College of the Church of Our
Lady of St. Mary, Ottery (SC 8/63/3142) (1377), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.national
archives.gov.uk/details/r/C9106905 [http://perma.cc/DY2W-HT57].
103
SC 8/61/3007, supra note 99. In 1280 and 1364, the tenants of Crondall and Hessebourne
in Hampshire claimed that their manors had been in the hands of “the ancestors of the Lord
King,” which, although fairly vaguely worded, in fact represented an extraordinary feat of communal memory going back as far as the tenth or ninth centuries (and was accepted by Edward
III in spite of the entry in Domesday Book which said it had always belonged to the Church).
See Rosamond Faith, The “Great Rumour” of 1377 and Peasant Ideology, in THE ENGLISH
RISING OF 1381, at 43, 56–57 (R. H. Hilton & T. H. Aston eds., 1984).
104
SC 8/201/10005, supra note 98 (eyent en use du temps sont memorie ne cour).
105
See Paul Brand, “Time Out of Mind”: The Knowledge and Use of the Eleventh- and
Twelfth-Century Past in Thirteenth-Century Litigation, in 16 ANGLO-NORMAN STUDIES:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BATTLE CONFERENCE 37, 54 (Marjorie Chibnall ed., 1993).
106
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
107
See, e.g., SC 8/201/10005, supra note 98; SC 8/167/8334, supra note 102; SC
8/61/3007, supra note 99.
108
SC 8/61/3007, supra note 99.
109
Faith, supra note 103, at 63–64.
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For a wide-ranging exploration of this theme, see Susan Reynolds, Secular Power and
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such, they also constitute an ongoing dialectic between personal freedom and villeinage
played out both in a manorial context and with reference to the royal courts.111
Frequently they comprise allegations of illegality in terms of the behaviour of lords
towards their tenants, notably attempts to downgrade their status (and thus their
tenure) with detrimental consequences.112 The men of Mickleover, for example,
were aggrieved at the actions of the abbot of Burton upon Trent.113 Allegedly, he had
distrained them (seized property for rent or services owed) in order to force them to
acknowledge themselves as villeins when they were ancient demesne tenants.114 The
tenants of Manton (ancient demesne of the crown) were equally distraught.115 They
said that they held their land freely of the abbot of Cluny, but had now been reduced
to servitude following the removal of eighty acres, which had occurred without a
corresponding reduction in the amount of rent owed.116 They were extremely worried
as they were unable to pursue an action in law as a consequence of their impoverishment and reduced status.117 The free sokemen of the manor of Harmondsworth
similarly encountered harsh and unjust treatment from their ecclesiastical landlord:
distraints against their customary levels were compounded by the harm suffered by
their lord’s refusal to accept their legal status and his contravention of the findings
of an inquest on the matter.118
Recourse to litigation and to the mechanism of petitioning the crown to achieve
their aims was clearly not alien to the lowest orders of society.119 Customary tenants
Authority in the Middle Ages, in POWER AND IDENTITY IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ESSAYS IN
MEMORY OF REES DAVIES (Huw Price & John Watts eds., 2007).
111
MARK BAILEY, THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM BONDAGE TO FREEDOM 291, 293 (2014).
112
R. H. Hilton, Peasant Movements in England Before 1381, 2 ECON. HIST. REV. 117,
126, 135 (ser. 2, 1949).
113
Petitioners: The Men of Mickleover, County Derby to the Chancellor (SC 1/48/86)
(1272–1307), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C12228637
[http://perma.cc/7LG6-662F].
114
Id.
115
Petitioners: Tenants of Manton (SC 8/266/13288) (c.327–c.1340), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517235 [http://perma.cc/B8RV-VPEF].
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Petitioners: People of Harmondsworth (SC 8/203/10143) (1307–1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9333698 [http://perma.cc/ZT5S-MVC6]
(en contre lour droit estat et la forme del inquest . . . a lour graunt damage). Whether this means
an inquiry into their estate or a jury assessing the correct levels of amercement is not clear.
119
Phillipp R. Schofield, Peasants, Litigation and Agency in Medieval England: The
Development of Law in Manorial Courts in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth
Centuries, in 14 THIRTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 15, 20–21 (Janet Burton et al. eds., 2013);
see Phillipp R. Schofield, Peasants and the Manor Court: Gossip and Litigation in a Suffolk
Village at the Close of the Thirteenth Century, 159 PAST & PRESENT 3, 3–5 (1998) [hereinafter Peasants and the Manor Court].
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were likely to issue such challenges outside of their normal environment, as the
lord’s control over the manor court was such that they were unlikely to be able to
overturn or undermine his property interests in that forum.120 While a response to the
circumstances alleged in such petitions is not always forthcoming from the crown,
it is noticeable that in the first half of the fourteenth century, before the growing
discontent and concerted peasant request for clarification of their status during the
1370s, efforts were made to examine claims and provide remedy where appropriate.
By the later fourteenth century, the benefits of the common law were increasingly
sought over the localised custom of the manor, testing the authority and resolve of
landlords and the weakening bonds of lordship.121 The grievance of the poures
gentes of Melbourne and King’s Newton, tenants of the ancient demesne manor of
Melbourne, for instance, cites previous petitions to parliament and the king’s council
and requests the proper implementation of writs from chancery to uphold their rights
as demanded by the ley de terre.122
The petitions also reveal how peasants were using the mechanisms and processes of royal government to question issues of taxation and status. Requests for
inquiry or confirmation of liability to tallage on the royal ancient demesne were
made by various groups of tenants.123 The crown’s poor tenants of Archenfield in
Herefordshire were particularly aggrieved that they had mistakenly been taxed by
the county assessors “contrary to their laws,”124 while the tenants of Tunstead, in the
honour of the castle of High Peak, the king’s ancient demesne, claimed it was down
to a clerical error that they had been placed on the rent roll in the first place.125
This questioning of the status quo and familiarity with Magna Carta penetrated
further, extending to those at the lowest levels of society and who were clearly
unfree. Addressing the Prior of Christ Church Canterbury (their manorial lord), the
customary tenants of the manor of Bocking articulated their complaints against a
new bailiff (John le Doo) with express reference to Magna Carta.126 They cited
120

See Peasants and the Manor Court, supra note 119, at 40, 42.
See, e.g., Petitioners: Warden and Canons of the Collegiate Church of Ottery St. Mary
(SC 8/251/12549) (1399), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details
/r/C9440155 [http://perma.cc/YP37-WK4K] (as in the dispute between the warden and college
of Ottery St. Mary and its manorial tenants).
122
Petitioners: People of Melbourne and King’s Newton (SC 8/8/366) (1324–1325),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060490 [http://perma
.cc/R9SP-GD6W]; see also CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC
RECORD OFFICE: EDWARD III A.D. 1323–1327, at 225 (1898).
123
Petitioners: Poor People of Oakham, Langham and Egleton in Rutland 149 (SC 8/132/
6562) (c.1300–c.1350), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details
/r/C9208743 [http://perma.cc/6HVR-6PZQ].
124
SC 8/167/8334, supra note 102.
125
Petitioners: Tenants of Tunstead (SC 8/339/15976) (1334), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9736457 [http://perma.cc/RX5A-PAVP].
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Nichols, supra note 93, at 300–01.
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breach of customary practice, the unreasonableness of new demands and framed
assessment of their liability for amercement (adopting the language of clause 14),127
as needing to be “by their peers according to the extent of their trespass.”128 Aping
its phraseology, Magna Carta is clearly couched as applicable to them in that they
claimed (or it was claimed on their behalf) the steward’s behaviour was “against all
reason and the Great Charter.”129
The articulation of these feelings in petitions to the Crown (and to manorial
lords), setting out the nature of their grievances extremely clearly (some in contemplation of or as a result of legal proceedings) illustrate the burgeoning legal consciousness of members of the peasantry whose formal status in the eyes of the law
(as villeins) or low economic standing (as husbandmen and labourers) normally
militated against active participation in legal matters beyond the manor court.130
Since many of the complaints voiced in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries were symptoms of long-running disputes,131 they not only underline the
impact of perceptions of Magna Carta, but also confirm that these issues were not
purely a reflection of the altered economic situation after the Black Death.132
II. PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES
While petitions often had an eye on the formalities of litigation, the format of
the petition enabled individuals to couch their grievance on their own terms, which
if the complaint did not easily fit within a common law remedy meant pushing the
conceptual legal boundaries.133 William de Moumby’s complaint that John de
Hardingham, clerk of the sheriff of London, had not allowed him to pursue his
business as an attorney (representing William le Heanmer of Fleet Street) and had
wrongfully ejected him, centred on his claim that he had been barred from his
livelihood against Magna Carta,134 which seems to be expanding the ambit of clause
127

MAGNA CARTA (1225).
Nichols, supra note 93, at 306 (translating Canterbury Manuscripts Rural Economy
No. 4).
129
Id. at 300–07.
130
See MUSSON, supra note 63, at 86–88; W. M. ORMROD, POLITICAL LIFE IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND, 1300–1450, at 40–41 (1995).
131
See Rosamond Faith, The Class Struggle in the Fourteenth Century, in PEOPLE’S
HISTORY AND SOCIAL THEORY 50, 50–60 (Raphael Samuel ed., 1981) (discussing the complex urban and manorial lord-tenant disagreements in St Albans); see also MARJORIE MORGAN,
THE ENGLISH LANDS OF THE ABBEY OF BEC (1946) (discussing the dispute between the
villeins of Ogbourne and the abbot of Bec).
132
SC 8/63/3142, supra note 102. For the broader historical context, see Hilton, supra note
12, at 117–36. See generally BAILEY, supra note 111.
133
See Schofield, supra note 119, at 18–19, 21.
134
Petitioners: William de Moumby (SC 8/320/E445) (1319), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9529497 [http://perma.cc/TX9J-4LBS].
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29.135 The petition of Theobald, the son and minor heir of William Russell, correctly
cites Magna Carta clause 5, relating to wardship,136 but then claims that the heir should
have proper maintenance out of the revenues, an additional clause not contained
within the Great Charter.137
The need to justify continued enjoyment of freedoms and privileges in the face
of blanket allegations to the contrary is evidenced by the arguments put forward by
parties in a case concerning trespass to a ship in Plymouth Sound reviewed in the
court of King’s Bench in 1384.138 Referencing clause 9 of Magna Carta,139 the
complainant, Osbert Hamely, sought to uphold the right and privilege of the reeve
and burgesses of Padstow to hear pleas relating to maritime matters on the grounds
that “it is contained in the Great Charter of the liberties of England that the barons
of the Cinque Ports and all other seaports are to have all their ancient liberties and
free customs.”140 By analogy, it was argued, so too should Padstow, an ancient
Cornish town and a port where their ancestors from time immemorial had used and
enjoyed certain franchises.141 This, as Hamely contended, included local admiralty
jurisdiction, the right to hear all pleas pertaining to maritime law at flood tide.142 The
defendant, a certain John Alweston of Plymouth, thought differently and rebutted
any claims to this privileged jurisdiction.143 He maintained that Padstow was not an
ancient borough, but merely an upland town held of the prior of Bodmin, whose
franchises and jurisdiction were distinctly limited to those of the Court Baron.144
Alweston not only denied the reeve and burgesses could hold a maritime court, but
was prepared to set the bar higher by alleging the town’s encroachment on royal
authority, contending, in more serious terms, that entertaining such a plea was “in
contravention of the law and in disherison of the king and in lese-majesty.”145
Although no judgment was given in the case, the reposte suggests the (exaggerated)
lengths parties were prepared to go where Magna Carta was set as the benchmark.146
135
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The National Archives, Court of King’s Bench, Plea Rolls, KB 27/491 m.51 (Hilary 1384),
in 7 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH UNDER RICHARD II,
HENRY IV AND HENRY V 35–39 (G. O. Sayles ed., 1971).
139
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Id. at 35.
143
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See SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY: THE COURT OF THE ADMIRALTY OF THE
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William de Cleydon’s grievance is unusual in that it not only relates to several
clauses of Magna Carta,147 but also confuses or conflates provisions of the Great
Charter with the Forest Charter. Providing his credentials as a freemen, Cleydon
boldly states with authority (come il est contenuz en la grant charter) that a free man
can erect a mill in his own land as long as it is not to the nuisance of his neighbours.148
This provision does not actually occur either in the 1215 or 1225 versions of Magna
Carta, but rather forms clause 12 of the Forest Charter (both the 1217 and 1225
versions).149 However, Cleydon (or his legal advisor) appears to have glossed the
precise nature of the provision in his favour in that clause 12 speaks of the mill lying
in the (royal) forest (quam habet in foresta) not simply forming his own land (en son
soil proprie issint) in the vill of Sudbourne.150 Further, in complaining that the
bailiffs of John Sturmyn, keeper of Orford Castle (Suffolk), have detained his corn
from this mill to his damage and disinheritance and that this wrong has been committed “without judgment,”151 Cleydon seems to be invoking both clause 19 and
clause 29.152 He underlines his justification by asking the king for the justices of
king’s or common benches to inquire concerning this trespass “according to law and
reason and the purport of the Great Charter.”153
A sense of how litigants were pushing the boundaries can also be gleaned from
the endorsements to petitions, written comments on the back (or occasionally on the
face) of the piece of parchment, within which citations of Magna Carta can occur.154
These endorsements are presumably responses from those specially appointed at the
start of parliament for hearing private grievances, panels that included lords, higher
clergy and senior lawyers.155 They can also contain feedback from others of the
king’s council, such as the chancellor or treasurer, who had been specifically asked
to respond.156 Not all petitions received a response.157 Some endorsements are more
147

Petitioners: William de Cleydon (Claydon) (SC 8/39/1943) (c.1317), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
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See id. at 52.
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laconic than informative; others take the form of bureaucratic or ministerial instructions or internal memoranda rather than comments directed to the petitioner,158
though doubtless the outcome was relayed somehow.159 If there was no action, the
petitioner often returned at the next parliament with a duplicate or similarly worded
petition and sometimes added the lack of answer to the complaint.160 This (as will
be seen below) in itself could form a grievance founded on Magna Carta: delay in
obtaining justice.161
Some of the responses suggest the petitioners are not wholly aware of the
current law, maybe citing outdated statute books or perhaps just “trying it on.” The
instruction to Wybert de la Clowere, the nephew and executor of Nicholas de Cantin,
an alien merchant, for example, was that he should obtain a writ of debt in Chancery
rather than try and sue in the Exchequer because he is not able to plead for debt at
the Exchequer as it is against Magna Carta:162 in this case chapter 4 of the Articuli
super cartas, which had added the proviso that no common pleas shall be held in the
Exchequer.163 Other merchants seeking a special privilege from the court of the
steward to hear pleas of debts for loans for which it was claimed they otherwise
would have no means of recovery were equally informed that this was contrary to
Magna Carta.164 In this case chapter 3 of the Articuli, which represented an attempt
to confine the court of the steward and marshal (or the itinerant “court of the verge”
as it was known) to its proper business of hearing the complaints of members of the
household rather pleas of land, debt, contract or trespass relating to all-comers.165
The prioress and convent of Broadholme (Nottinghamshire) may have been
pushing the boundaries when they complained that they were being ruined on
account of loss of rents owing to the fault of the wardens of the religious house and
wanted a charter from the king enabling them to have self-determination of their
rents and enclosures (emproumens) for the benefit (al profist de la dit meyson) of the
house.166 It is not clear from the petition whether the wardens (gardeyns) mentioned
are in charge of the house or as administrators have (or had) custody of it during a
vacancy, which would fall under clause 4 of Magna Carta and would support a valid
158

See, e.g., SC 8/8/366, supra note 122.
DODD, supra note 40, at 52–53; Dodd & Petit-Renaud, supra note 157, at 270–71.
160
As occurred with Robert de Thorpe. See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text.
161
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
162
Petitioners: Wybert de la Clowere (Cloere), nephew and executor of Nicholas de Cantin,
Merchant of Doval (SC 8/329/E932) (c.1295–c.1315), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery
.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9682927 [http://perma.cc/7ZRR-RQ37].
163
ARTICULI SUPER CARTAS, 1300, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov
.uk/education/resources/magna-carta/articuli-super-cartas/ [http://perma.cc/BHD2-NVE5].
164
SC 8/329/E939, supra note 154.
165
ARTICULI SUPER CARTAS, supra note 163.
166
Petitioners: Prioress and Convent of Broadholme (SC 8/5/217) (1321–1322), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060337 [http://perma.cc/294Z
-6NDT].
159
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grievance,167 but the upshot of the request was that the petition was deemed to be
‘unjust’ and (in modern parlance) could not be actioned.168 The reasoning behind
this decision is not given, though it may be that the priory having already received in
1318 and 1319 charters confirming grants made to the house (the latter issued jointly
with Newhouse Abbey across the border in Lincolnshire) had also applied for licence in mortmain in 1320 and had been allowed to acquire lands, tenements, and
rents to the value of £10.169 To grant them further concessions therefore may have
seemed unjust in the circumstances.
In at least one instance the endorsement to a petition concerning fines for beaupleader,170 which the community of Bedfordshire claims the sheriff has been levying
a large amount every year, carries instructions that the petitioners are to have a writ
“founded on Magna Carta” and “the statute made in the first year of the present king”
(Edward III).171 Writs “founded on Magna Carta”172 were never prescribed in precise
form, but this complaint appears to be based on a conflation of two notions: excessive
amercement (against clause 14 of Magna Carta)173 and prohibition of beaupleader
taken up in the statute of 1327 but originally found in the Statute of Marlborough
(clause 11).174
Inaccuracies in the citation or glosses of the Charter used in petitions would
seem to suggest the scrivener or clerk preparing it was proceeding on the basis of
their own recollection or the gist of the text rather than one actively consulted. It is
also not necessarily the case that only an imprecise citation is the mark of a nonlawyer! An examination of citations of the Great Charter by pleaders in the Year
167

MAGNA CARTA (1225).
SC 8/5/217, supra note 166 (Iniusta est petitio ideo non potest fieri).
169
3 CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS: PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE:
EDWARD II: A.D. 1317–1321, at 253 (1 Dec.), 397 (8 Dec.), 518 (7 Nov.) (1903); House of
Premonstratensian Canonesses: The Priory of Broadholme, in 2 A HISTORY OF THE COUNTY
OF NOTTINGHAM 138–40 (William Page ed., 1910), BRITISH HIST. ONLINE, http://www.british
-history.ac.uk/vch/notts/vol2/pp138-140 [http://perma.cc/BW3X-DMS6].
170
A fine paid by jurors or county communities to avoid the consequences of wrongful
judgments relating to outlawry or inaccurate statements of custom.
171
Petitioners: Community of Bedfordshire (SC 8/32/1585) (c.1328), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061782 [http://perma.cc/DP7A-GQQW];
1 Edw. III, Stat. 2, c.8 (1326–27), in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 256.
172
SC 8/32/1585, supra note 171.
173
MAGNA CARTA (1225). For another example of a writ ‘foundu sur la graunte chartre’
in relation to clause 14 (where the recipient was the bailiff of the bishop of Winchester), see
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 46; Seipp, supra note 28 (using Seipp Number 1316.050ss).
174
52 Hen. III, c.11 (1267), in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 22–23; PAUL BRAND, KINGS,
BARONS AND JUSTICES: THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION IN THIRTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 87–90 (2003). Under clause 42 of the 1217 version of Magna Carta,
sheriffs were also cautioned not to seek exceptions “to ammerce,” though the text of the
petition does not provide any evidence that this was suspected. POCKET MAGNA CARTA:
1217 TEXT AND TRANSLATION 36–37 (Bodleian Library ed., 2016).
168
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Books yields some “occasional misconception[s] or frivolous exception[s]” as
lawyers push the boundaries too.175 Yet this may equally be a product of relying on
the unofficial texts copied into statute books, which appear to contain some differences not only in the versions of Magna Carta included, but also in the choice of
language used in individual clauses.176
Indeed, a survey of just a fraction of the surviving statute books shows not all
provisions of Magna Carta were correctly copied: some have annotated corrections
or interlineations (where words have been missed out)177 or have updated cross
references in the margins.178 The Latin quoted in Robert Thorpe’s second Magna
Carta citation differs slightly linguistically from certain other contemporary versions
of that part of the text.179 Nor, indeed, was the numbering of clauses by the scribes
of statute books entirely accurate or consistent internally. The list of chapters
preceding the text of Magna Carta in various books does not tally with the individual clauses. One volume does not number the clauses of Magna Carta individually,
but provides numbering in red in the margin at intervals of ten (X, XX, XXX) as a
guideline. Unfortunately, the roman numerals do not correspond to the correct clauses.
In others, the ‘safeguarding of the franchises of the city’ of London, for instance, is
slated at IX in volumes with ‘capitularia,’ but then occurs opposite VIII in the text.180
Similarly, the ‘capitularia’ gives the ‘no free man’ clause (de imprisonamento) variously as XXVIII or XXVII, but then places the wording of the provision at XXVI
or (more usually) XXV.181
Matters relating to the Great Charter raised by individual petitioners or communities were sometimes felt to encompass broader issues or a much wider constituency. The tinners of Cornwall, for example, argued in relation to their claim (not
being paid in the standard coinage of London) that the ‘points and measures’ of
175

THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 52.
Occasionally they are King John’s or alternatively King Henry III’s (e.g., BL MS
Harley 79 fol. 2r; Cambridge, MA, Harvard Law School MS 57 fol. lr https://listview.lib
.harvard.edu/lists/hollis-014294028 [http://perma.cc/Q267-XN3L]) rather than Edward I’s
1297 confirmation.
177
See, e.g., HLS MS 184 fol. 9v (‘quos’ for ‘quod’), 10v (additions in the margin); MS
161 fol. 7v. (‘mercatores’ is added in the margin as omitted from the text of c.26).
178
See, e.g., HLS MS 179 fol. 19r (reference to Westminster I c.6), 21r (reference to
Westminster I c.1).
179
Thorpe’s petitions cite: “Concessimus eciam [eisdem] pro nobis et heredibus nostris quod
nec nos nec heredes nostri aliquid perquiremus per quod libertates [predicte] in hac Carta
contente infringeantur vel infirmentur et [si ab] aliquid ab aliquo contra hoc perquisitum
fuerit nichil valeat et pro nullo habeatur.” SC 8/166/8297, supra note 52; SC 8/266/13299,
supra note 62. This differs slightly [as indicated by words in square brackets] from the
versions given in, for example, HLS MS 28 fol. 3v and MS 161 fol. 8v.
180
See, e.g., HLS MS 175 fol. 1v, 7r.
181
See, e.g., HLS MS 174 fol. 3r, 22v; MS 175 fols. 2r, 9v; see also MS 57 fol. 7v; MS
80 fol. 3r.
176
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Magna Carta should apply to the whole realm.182 Similarly, the bakers of London
complained that the punishment for defective bread newly instituted by the mayor
did not conform to Magna Carta (‘which holds that the city has all its franchises and
ancient customs in their entirety and unimpaired’) in being harsher than any punishments used elsewhere in the land and also lacked legitimacy in that it was made
outside of parliament and ‘without the common counsel of the land.’183 Joan de
Siggeston’s request for a reasonable part of her husband’s goods and chattels had
allegedly been long delayed, rather than ‘immediately and without difficulty’184 as
Magna Carta clause 7 proscribed;185 an issue that was felt to be touching the commons not just one person, and so the king’s council were to be advised.186 This has
roughly been dated (by the compilers of the National Archives calendar entry) to the
second quarter of the fourteenth century possibly linking in with the commons’
concern for Magna Carta expressed in common petitions of that period.187
A broader appeal also lay depending on the nature of the clause. The guarantee of
free passage by water was not limited to the Rivers Thames and Medway (the rivers
specifically mentioned in Magna Carta clause 23),188 but was extended by the Great
Charter (and various later statutes reiterating the principle)189 to cover all navigable
rivers.190 Nevertheless the various man-made obstructions that diverted waterways
out of their ‘auncien et dreiturel cours’ remained an issue for various communities
throughout the fourteenth century, who requested inquiries and ‘ammendment’ accordingly.191 Some of these private issues were also taken up by the parliamentary
182

Petitioners: Merchants and Tinners of Cornwall (SC 8/103/5129) (c.1324), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9149699 [http://perma.cc
/7NTB-XZ9V]. They add that this would be “for the profit” of the king and queen (for further
discussion of this phrase see below).
183
Petitioners: The Bakers of London (SC 8/59/2926) (1318), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9063146 [http://perma.cc/H3CV-AULC] (en la graunt
chartre qe la diste citee eit toux ces faunchises e auncienes custumes entieres e nonblemies).
184
Petitioners: Joan de Siggeston (Sigston), Widow of Thomas de Siggeston (SC 8/159/
7927) (1327–1350), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r
/C9210119 [http://perma.cc/SYJ7-MZGQ].
185
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
186
SC 8/159/7927, supra note 184.
187
Id.
188
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
189
See, e.g., a petition from the commons of York dated to c.1388 states the removal of
dams and weirs from rivers “was ordained by a statute of the present king.” CALENDAR OF
THE PATENT ROLLS: PRESERVED IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE: RICHARD II: A.D.
1385–1389, at 471 (1900) [hereinafter CPR 1385–1389]; Petitioners: Commons of Yorkshire
(SC 8/199/9928) (c.1388), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details
/r/C9295817 [http://perma.cc/R6Z5-5CNY].
190
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 23.
191
See, e.g., Petitioners: People of the Commonality of Kesteven in the County of Lincoln
(SC 8/11/539) (1334), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r
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commons and brought into the public arena,192 either because lobbyists from various
regions with similar causes had joined together or private petitions were being deliberately diverted away from the committees processing them towards the session
of parliament itself in order to achieve prominence for the request or perhaps raise
the chances of a more favourable outcome.193
Broadening the range of authorities to include the common law can also be seen
in a petition sent to the king from archbishop William Melton as part of his dispute
with the bailiffs of the port of Hull, who claimed that their seizing prises of wine
which were the right of the church of York and the rents of the archbishop’s tenants
without judgement or process of law amounted to severe treatment against the law
and against Magna Carta.194 Claims of illegality with regard to purveyance was an
enduring problem faced by the crown and clearly one that could impede the enjoyment of franchisal rights (under clause 29)195 too.196 Melton’s complaint, however,
chimes with the scathing treatise on the evils of purveyance (particularly with regard
to the goods of ecclesiastics) written around the same time by his southern counterpart Simon Meopham, archbishop of Canterbury (1327–33).197
The continued perception of the Great Charter as legal authority can be seen
more broadly in the type of grievances submitted in petitions which appear as
elaborations of aspects of clause 29 (and other provisions).198 John Mandour, for
example, maintained that he was properly appointed under canon law ( fist duement
/C9060666 [http://perma.cc/D9MK-LECE]; Petitioners: Merchants of London (SC 8/259/
12922) (c.1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C94
40535 [http://perma.cc/PSM6-UARN]; Petitioners: Commons of Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire
and Yorkshire (SC 8/165/8226) (1324), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives
.gov.uk/details/r/C9294071 [http://perma.cc/W8XR-5E3K]; Petitioners: People of Somerset
who have Lands on the Rivers Yeo and Parrett (SC 8/339/15979) (c.1310, c.1330), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9736460 [http://perma.cc/3JMJ
-D8MP].
192
See, for example, the 1365 petition from Somerset and Wiltshire regarding obstructions
on the River Avon, Petitioners: Community of the Counties of Somerset and Wiltshire (SC 8/
293/14647) (1365), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9
735809 [http://perma.cc/VUQ4-K6RN], an issue which was taken up by the commons in the
mid-fourteenth century onwards. See also DODD, supra note 40, at 129.
193
This phenomenon came to a head in the parliament of 1372. See 5 PROME, supra note
62, at 251–55, providing an introduction to the Parliament of 1372.
194
Petitioners: William Melton, Archbishop of York (SC 8/11/515) (c.1330), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060642 [http://perma.cc/KRY3
-ZV3G].
195
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
196
See, e.g., Petitioners: Commons (SC 8/272/13584) (1337–1339), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517531 [http://perma.cc/BBA3-HW2R]; Petitioners: The Petitioner Name(s) Illegible (SC 8/272/13587) (c.1337–c.1339), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517534 [http://perma.cc/K949-DTKU].
197
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 128–29.
198
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
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par la ley de seinte esglise collacion) to the archdeaconry of Durham, but the appointment was later revoked by the king and given to an alternative candidate,
Cardinal Pilet, who was later confirmed in the position under letters patent.199
Mandour argued for reinstatement on the basis of the injustice of the king’s actions:
that he had been ousted on false allegations (suggestions nient veritables), that writs
to collect the fruits of his benefice had been issued unlawfully (grantez en countre
droit) and without process against him either in the royal courts or in the church
courts.200 Mandour’s justification further underlined clause 29201 of Magna Carta by
alleging that this was patently against the law (en countre la ley notariement).202 In
a final salvo (covering the relevant ‘laws of the land’ phrase) he released the twin
barrels of canon law and common law (a les leys de seynt esglise e de realme),203 a
volley that ultimately hit the mark as letters patent were duly issued in August 1387
for Maundour to replace Cardinal Pilet in the archdeaconry.204
In many instances the focus of petitions raising or shadowing clause 29 concern
contentious issues related to legal disputes, including cases of wrongful imprisonment or outlawry.205 Others involve specific procedural or substantive points.206 The
petitioners highlight conflicts of jurisdiction,207 including alleged disseisin of rights
‘wrongfully and without judgment,’208 and more general difficulties affecting the
199

Petitioners: John Mandour, Clerk (SC 8/21/1021) (1381–1387), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061181 [http://perma.cc/QAY3-E5LK].
200
Id.
201
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
202
SC 8/21/1021, supra note 199.
203
Id.
204
CPR 1385–1389, supra note 189, at 349, 431.
205
Petitioners: Richard de Beverley (Beverley) (SC 8/33/1635) (1331), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061832 [http://perma.cc/W72K-67U5];
Petitioners: Henry de Bucketon (Buckton of Cornwall) (SC 8/36/1799) (1318–1319), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062001 [http://perma.cc/B7Y4
-2NJZ]; Petitioners: Henry de Bucketon (Buckton of Cornwall) (SC 8/36/1800) (1318–1319),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062002 [http://perma
.cc/T5EJ-5BLT].
206
See, e.g., Petitioners: Prior and Convent of Bury St. Edmunds (SC 8/34/1667) (1382),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061864 [http://perma
.cc/N97A-KS6K] (record and process); Petitioners: Robert de Bylkemore (Bilkemore); Anastasia
de Bylkemore (Bilkemore), wife of Robert de Bylkemore (SC 8/37/1826) (1346–1353), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062028 [http://perma.cc/6F4U
-N5HG] (procedural delays in an assize); Petitioners: Robert Busse, Prior of Montacute (SC
8/37/1834) (1327–1328), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details
/r/C9062036 [http://perma.cc/2MFA-HQXJ] (problem suing in an ecclesiastical court).
207
See, e.g., Petitioners: Abbot of Battle (SC 8/34/1658) (1307–1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061855 [http://perma.cc/2BLE-QDV6].
208
Petitioners: Abbot and Convent of Langouste (Valle Cruis) (SC 8/268/13385) (1284–
1300), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517332 [http://
perma.cc/LJB4-9W3C] (deseysi e hosta de cel gors a tort e saunz jugement).
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conduct of litigation or concerning the administration of justice.209 In doing so they
highlight problems with access to justice, including the convenience of the forum
and the fairness of proceedings. Many of these complaints ride on perceptions of the
costs and delays inherent in litigation, which were subjective reactions to circumstances rather than objective criticism of the system. The burden of costs and length
of time before a hearing took place was not unsurprisingly a nuisance for merchants,210
but they were not the only ones affected. Ancient demesne tenants of Milton Keynes
sought a remedy from the king because they claimed a decision in their suit against
their manorial lord (who had been demanding performance of unaccustomed services)
was being unnecessarily delayed procedurally in a form of judicial tennis: the justices in the court of common pleas informed them that ‘lor pleinte’ should be seen
by the chancellor in chancery, who in turn responded that it ought to be decided by the
justices of the Bench.211 The delay itself was having repercussions in that allegedly
the petitioners had been attacked and threatened by their lord in an attempt to prevent
them from proceeding in the plea.212 Such intimidation, whether actual or feared,
was clearly preventing or inhibiting access to the courts to the extent that there were
other ancient demesne tenants who sought the king’s protection during their suit to
ensure that nobody involved suffered molestation nor came to any physical harm nor
had their property damaged.213 The issue was also taken up by the commons in
1378–1379 who requested that “all your lieges and subjects might be able freely and
peaceably and in sure and safe protection of the king to go and come to your courts,
to sue their actions or defend themselves without disturbance or hindrance . . . .”214
The costs of litigation and delays were emotive issues that could easily reflect
209

Petitioners: Agnes Bacun (Bacon) (SC 8/32/1560) (c.1288), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061757 [http://perma.cc/LW8B-98R4] (alleges
bribes and favour of justices); Petitioners: Abbot and Convent of Byland (SC 8/37/1825)
(1370), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062027 [http://
perma.cc/P8S3-XFMG] (urges empanelling of a jury of ‘good people’ rather than suspect
ones); Petitioners: John de Argenteyan (SC 8/31/1503) (1323–1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061697 [http://perma.cc/537A-JZFM]
(alleges bribery of assize justice, John Bousser so he would not allow challenges or exceptions); Petitioners: Henry de Chatterton (SC 8/39/1915) (c.1380), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://
discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9062118 [http://perma.cc/PEQ5-FJRR] (complains inquisition procured and false indictments made).
210
See, e.g., SC 8/329/E939, supra note 154.
211
Petitioners: Poor People of Milton Keynes (SC 8/201/10006) (c.1272–c.1300), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9333562 [http://perma.cc
/3LMW-JYFJ].
212
Id.
213
SC 8/61/3007, supra note 99 (qil vous plese graunter un proteccioun pour les dits
poures tenauntz duraunt lour seute qu nul homme les face mal ne moleste damage de corps
ne de chateux); see also Petitioners: Tenants of the Manor of Northam (SC 8/64/3171)
(1330–1340), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9106934
[http://perma.cc/ZVT6-SPBV].
214
THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 41 n.18 (my own translation).
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expectations of the benchmark of royal justice and not surprisingly remained a live
issue in spite of being raised in parliament and reiterated in various statutes.215
III. LINGUISTIC STRATEGIES
Citation of Magna Carta increasingly became part of the rhetoric of petitioning.
Citizens of London were quite vocal with petitions stemming from both the community and from individuals (sometimes raising similar or the same issues). They
frequently linked the cities’ liberties and clause 9 with a blanket phrase “contrary
to their franchises and the Great Charter.”216 One from the mayor and community
railing about the behaviour of the court of the steward and marshal of the king’s
household attaching citizens to appear there reinforces their claim by citing not only
Magna Carta and their own charters and franchises, but also the Ordinances of 1311
as authority.217 While they could legitimately cite these documents (and a writ confirming that citizens should not be so attached confirming the privilege as granted
by their charter, confirmed by the Great Charter and the New Ordinances is preserved
in the Liber Albus),218 there is a sense in which London and other urban corporations
adopted a ‘belt and braces’ approach in their petitions. The burgesses of Oxford, for
example, in a long running dispute against the University added a further element
into the mix citing not only their ancient and customary franchises and the Great
Charter of Franchises, but also ‘lei de terre,’ the common law.219

215

For example:
Also, the said community prays: because the chancery is a place where
it is fitting for a man to have recovery and begin to sue his right by
writ, that he might have the said writs without paying anything other
than the fee of the seal, as the Great Charter wills, ‘We shall sell to noone, we shall deny to no-one or delay right or justice’, because many
men have been delayed of their right and some disinherited because the
clerks of the chancery have refused them writs which on other occasions used to be granted without paying anything, and also the king has
suffered great loss from this.
Parliament of February 1334, item 7, in 4 PROME, supra note 62, at 199. For examples of
legislation, see generally 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM (1377–1504).
216
Petitioners: People of London (SC 8/259/12917) (c.1328), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9440530 [http://perma.cc/5FYW-R8SK].
217
Petitioners: Citizens of London (SC 8/57/2848) (c.1328), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9063068 [http://perma.cc/5NN5-DT3D]; THOMPSON,
supra note 4, at 106–08.
218
LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY OF LONDON 478–79 (Henry T. Riley
trans., 1861) (1419).
219
Petitioners: Burgesses of Oxford (SC 8/202/10099) (1328) NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://dis
covery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9333654 [http://perma.cc/WS9Z-NRZH].
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Many petitions, if they do not include explicit reference to Magna Carta itself,
contain a rhetorical flourish (similar to the one in the petition from Robert Thorpe
referred to earlier) and ask the king to remedy the points contained within the said
petition “according to law and reason” or “if law and reason or right demand it.”220
Given the subject matter of such petitions, this phraseology is unlikely to be merely
rhetorical, but may in turn reflect a deliberate linguistic strategy to appeal to the
ideals of ‘ius’(or ‘droit’ as employed in Anglo-Norman French) and ‘ratio’ (or ‘reson’),
concepts stemming directly from Roman civil law that underpin the provisions of
Magna Carta.221 Indeed, a petition from the mayor, alderman and commonalty of
London in Richard II’s reign concerning the destruction of fish stocks (through
overfishing and the construction of weirs and other ‘engines’) not only demanded
better enforcement of existing statutes, but appealed to ‘divine law, natural law and
all other laws’ (come le ley de dieu e de nature e touz autres leyes).222 It is these very
phrases that are found in the later fourteenth century (and beyond) in the bills
submitted to the chancellor, forming the equitable jurisdiction the office gradually
assumed on behalf of the king.223 As Gwilym Dodd noted in his comparison of
different types of supplication: “chancery bills were articulated by drawing on a
corpus of legal diction. The language of justice and legality—or illegality—underpins
the vast majority of chancery cases . . . .”224 It was this discourse, combined with the
new language of ‘good faith and conscience’ that paved the way for the remedy by
the court of chancery of injustices that were supposed to lie outside the purview of the
common law courts, but which nevertheless inhabited the territory of clause 29,225
itself born out of the king’s duty to do right, make justice available to all and avoid
unnecessary delay in doing so.226
220

SC 8/166/8297, supra note 52. He includes “transcripts attached to this bill.” Transcript
(8/166/8298) (1325), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r
/C9294143 [http://perma.cc/VLU2-PJB8]; Transcript (8/166/8299) (1325), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9294144 [http://perma.cc/DRX6-UKTN].
221
See HOLT, supra note 6, at 120; R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 304–46, 322–23, 326–29, 340–42, 368–71 (1999).
222
Petitioners: Mayor, Alderman and Commonality of London (SC 8/121/6028) (1383–
1393), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9208194 [http://
perma.cc/5TGS-P7BY].
223
Writing Wrongs, supra note 49, at 230.
224
Id.
225
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
226
See generally Gwilym Dodd, Reason, Conscience and Equity: Bishops as the King’s
Judges in Later Medieval England, 99 HIST. 213, 213–40 (2014) (examining the role of bishops
as justices); Anthony Musson, The Influence of Canon Law on the Administration of Justice
in Late Medieval England, in 4 DER EINFLUSS DER KANONISTIK AUF DIE EUROPÄISCHE
RECHTSKULTUR 325, 325–41 (Yves Mausen et al. eds., 2014) (examining the effect of canon
law doctrine on the Medieval legal system and practitioners); Nigel Saul, Magna Carta in
the Late Middle Ages, c.1320–1520, in MAGNA CARTA: NEW INTERPRETATIONS (Nicholas
Vincent & Sophie Ambler eds., 2017).
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Concerns raised about access to justice and requests for remedies to correct
perceived shortcomings in the administration of justice reflected the monarch’s
responsibilities as set out in his coronation oath and were aspects of the broader
concept of ‘good governance’ that permeated medieval politics.227 Magna Carta’s
influence can be traced in the adoption of the language of ‘correction,’ or ‘reform’
or ‘betterment’ of the realm (ad exaltationem sancte ecclesie et amendacionem
Regni nostri)228 that formed part of its justificatory preamble.229 Although many
statute books retained a Latin version of Magna Carta (even where it prefaced
volumes of statuta nova),230 there were a number of French versions circulating in
the early fourteenth century to which legal advisors and litigants would have had
access.231 These sometimes differed in the precise formulation in the vernacular,
rendering the Latin variously as: “to the advancement of holy church and in betterment of our realm” (al avauncement de seint eglise e en amendement de nostre
Royalme)232 and “to the honour of God and the good of us and of our realm” (al
honur de deu e bien de nos et de notre reaume).233 The phrase had currency in the
vernacularised versions of Henry III’s Statute of Marlborough (1267)234 and Edward
I’s First Statute of Westminster (1275).235 In the Confirmation of the Charters (1297)
the crown cites the formula “a le honur de deu e de seynt eglise e al profit de tout
nostre reaume,”236 which is then echoed (though with the addition of the word
‘commun’) in the archbishop of Canterbury’s sentences on the confirmation.237 Using
227

See supra note 226.
See, e.g., HLS MS 28 fol. 1r; MS 39 fol. 1r; MS 49 fol. 17r; MS 54 fol. 10r. Some
slightly unusual variations occur in HLS MS 56 fol. 1r (ad exultationem et emendation sancte
ecclesie et Regni Anglie), MS 184 fol. 9r (ad exaltationem sancte crucis et emendationem regni
nostri), and BL MS Harley 926 fol. 9r which does not mention ‘amendationem’ (ad exaltatione
sancte matris ecclesie et eiusdem regni nostri).
229
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
230
See, e.g., Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Hatton 10; Oxford, Merton College MS 297B.
231
The earliest volumes in the Harvard Law School collection date from the late thirteenth
and first half of the fourteenth century (MSS 12, 28, 32, 33, 36, 39, 49, 54–59, 80, 101, 160,
163, 172, 213).
232
BL MS Harley 3937 fol. 1r; HLS MS 12 is fairly similar with differences only in
spelling: “al enhancement de seinte eglise e al amendement de nostre royaume.”
233
BL MS Harley 5326 fol. 4r.
234
HLS MS 33 fol. 22r (al amendement de son regne dengleterre e en exhibition de
dreiture).
235
HLS MS 32 fol. 29v (demendement e ceo pur le commun profit de seint eglise e du
roialme). See also with variant spelling, HLS M28 fol. 10r (de amendement pur le commun
profist de sainte eglise e de Roialme).
236
HLS MS 184 fol. 14r; see also HLS MS 33 fol. 15v–16r. The Confirmation of the
Charters uses the phrase: “par comun assent de tout le Realme e a comun profit de tut le
Reaume.”
237
HLS MS 184 fol. 15r (al honour de deu et seynt eglise e al commun profit de son
realme).
228
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a slightly different word (‘pru’), but one which carries the same meaning (‘profit’),
the additional Articles on the Charters (1300) were granted by Edward I to his people
‘por le pru de son realme.’238 The preambles to statutes in Edward III’s and Richard
II’s reigns similarly employ the ‘common profit’ formula,239 suggesting it had not
only become standardised in form, but a necessary tag in the minds of fourteenthcentury legislative draftsmen.240
Mark Ormrod highlights various “discursive strategies” in common petitions
during the mid-to-late fourteenth century, one of which was to identify their interests
with those of the king and the realm.241 There is evidence from linguistic usage in
private petitions that this phrase was also taken up by individuals, particular interest
groups and discrete communities.242 While the number of such instances overall in
relation to the total of surviving private petitions may be “extremely small,”243 it is
not altogether negligible in terms of the types of usage that emerges.244 Indeed, adoption of this phraseology by certain individuals and groups in relation to issues contained in the Great Charter—particularly those that had a broader application, alleged
fraudulent behaviour or had economic implications245—demonstrates an appreciation (if not direct application) of the textual precedents in Magna Carta and other
legislation. William Careles, for example, in claiming that revoking the supersedeas
(a writ stopping or delaying legal proceedings)246 against his suit of novel disseisin
will be to the king’s benefit (“a la profit”), deliberately frames his request as being
238

HLS MS 184 fol. 15v.
HLS MS 19 fols. 5v (Statute of Northampton, 2 Edward III: al honor de dieux e de
seint eglise e du comune profit du poeple), 52r (Statute of Westminster, 28 Edward III:
al honor de dieux e de seint eglise e du comune profit de lui mesmes e de son poeple
dengleterre), 79v (Statute of Westminster 2 Richard II st 2: a honor de dieu e de seint eglise
e pur comune profit du roiaume dengleterre).
240
See generally W. Mark Ormrod, “Common Profit” and “The Profit of the King and Kingdom”: Parliament and the Development of Political Language in England, 1250–1450, 46
VIATOR 219, 219–52 (2015) (analyzing the role of political language in the common petition).
241
Id. “[T]he use of common profit in early common petitions looks like a pragmatic and
sometimes rather desperate attempt to mobilize a mutuality of interests between crown and
people as a necessary means of sweetening the bitter pill of complaint.” Id. at 234.
242
See id. at 228–29.
243
Id. at 229.
244
Id. at 233–34.
245
See, e.g., Petitioners: William de Latymer (Latimer), Lord of Yarm (SC 8/9/434) (1305),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060560 [https://perma
.cc/G6WL-8UQS] (William Latimer’s request for pontage to repair the bridge at Yarm pur
comun profit des gentz passauntz); Petitioners: Citizens of Cork (SC 8/98/4891) (c.1322),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9149458 [https://perma
.cc/X8GY-4BZW] (citizens of Cork ask permission to construct weirs on the rivers in the
city, for its benefit en amendement de sa dite citie).
246
Supersedeas, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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“en emendement ces leys” as well as a rebuke (en chastiement) to those who bring
actions in courts outside the king’s jurisdiction when he has the cognizance of the
plea.247 In 1297, at a time when confirmation of franchises and charters were issues
in high politics,248 the burgesses of St. Albans complained to the crown that the
abbot was infringing certain rights they considered as being for their convenience
and belonging to their collective benefit (regardent com commun profit) and had
issued writs of conspiracy against them claiming remedy “pur vostre estat e leur e
commun profit.”249 The community of Bayonne (in 1300) similarly desired royal confirmation of their liberties and privileges and also their present and future statutes
for the advantage (ad utilitatem) of the land and of the citizens themselves.250
An economic imperative was accorded the petition from merchants using the
River Thames between London and Oxford who in 1320 not only invoke Magna
Carta clause 23251 complaining they were obstructed by weirs and other blockages
(such as locks and mills) “encountre statut” as well as having to pay tolls to their
owners, but specifically suggest that the king and council “might want to order that
remedy and correction be carried out on these aforesaid things for the common
profit of his people.”252 This same grievance, which clearly offends Magna Carta
(though the Great Charter itself is not specifically mentioned),253 was endorsed in the
same year by the people of both the city of Oxford and the whole county, who not
only emphasised the economic benefits (in that provisions and merchandise could be
brought there without impediment), but were not afraid of pointing out its reciprocal
benefits for the king and the wider community (pur graunt profit le Roi e soen
247

Petitioners: William Careles (Careless) (SC 8/274/13684) (c.1310–c.1335), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9517631 [https://perma.cc
/M7FM-WG82].
248
See McIlwain, supra note 3, at 8.
249
Petitioners: Burgesses and People of St Albans (SC 8/325/E684) (c.1297), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9682678 [https://perma.cc
/TG9M-NNJA].
250
Petitioners: Community of Bayonne (SC 8/236/11773) (c. 1300), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9335332 [https://perma.cc/3ZSK-KFBV].
251
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
252
Petitioners: Common Merchants Passing by Water between London and Oxford
(SC 8/125/6201) (c.1320), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details
/r/C9208374 [https://perma.cc/2EHP-A3WR] (q’il voillent commander qe remedie e
ammendement se facent sur les choses avaunt dites par le commune profit de son poeple).
They had already brought this to the king’s attention in 1302 and 1305 “pur profit la Roy
issint” and requested justices to be assigned to deal with the problems. Petitioners: Merchants
who Frequent the River Thames between London and Oxford (SC 8/10/474) (1305), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9060600 [https://perma.cc
/V527-WL2B]; Petitioners: Merchants who Frequent the River Thames between London and
Oxford (SC 8/10/477) (1302), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk
/details/r/C9060603 [https://perma.cc/TDY9-4VQ6].
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SC 8/125/6201, supra note 252.
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poeple).254 The sentiment of the phrase was clearly accepted by the crown as it is
echoed in response (though in Latin) as justification for action to be taken.255
Magna Carta was also invoked in 1320 by the clerks of Oxford University,
though in a slightly different way.256 Their complaint (concerning alleged deceit and
conspiracy on the part of the burgesses of the city when undertaking inquisitions for
death and wounding and in the application of weights and measures in Oxford) has
a long preamble which uses the phrase as part of a rhetorical positioning, almost as
a form of flattery:
[T]he University would not have been founded nor maintained, but
for the bounty of the good kings of England who wish to ensure
the common profit of the people as is befitting to them . . . and
is not able to have comfort or help, but by your supreme lordship. And the abovesaid clerks pray your highness and the kindness of your grace solely by way of common profit and justice
to maintain these things . . . .257
The word choice, while underlining the mutuality of royal assistance, nevertheless
appears to stress the moral and legal responsibilities of the king by linking common
profit and justice (or good faith) in this way.258
These are not isolated petitions, and their occurrence with others datable to
around or during the 1320s implies not only an absorption of the language being
used in high politics around this time into the language of private supplication, but
the initiation (in private petitions) of a discourse that associated the correction
afforded by Magna Carta with the responsibilities of the king to remedy specific
grievances related to its substantive provisions.259 A petition from the skinners of
London (datable to around 1320–1327), which complained of sharp practices and
referred to certain articles relating to trade in furs as ordained “for the common
profit of the important people and the community of the realm” links allegations of
254

Petitioners: Men of Oxford and of the Whole County of Oxfordshire (SC 8/86/4300)
(1320), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9148842 [https://
perma.cc/TSF4-ETLB].
255
Id. (pro utilitate Regis et populi fuerit facienda).
256
See Petitioners: Clerks of Oxford University (SC 8/86/4297) (1320), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9148839 [https://perma.cc/6HRS-8W6Z].
257
Id. (“mais qe par le bounte des bons Roys Denlgeterre queux vut toutditz avie commun
proffit du poeple com a eux appendit . . . et ne peut aver autre refer ou sucour mais par
vostre haute Seignurie . . . Por quey prient ces clers susditz a vostre hautesce et benarte[?]
de vostre grace taunt soulement par commun proffit e leaute meyntenir les choses . . . .”).
This petition is damaged and much of the text after this section is missing.
258
See id.
259
See THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 36–37.
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deceitful conduct with the need for correction.260 It was not just groups, who employed the phrase in this period, but individuals, too, such as William de Thorntoft,
who highlights problems with delays in justice and alleges undue influence on the
legal processes.261 In both his petitions (one submitted a year previously), Thorntoft
aligns his own plight—the way the legal processes have dragged on (ad longement
suwyn)—with the benefit that will accrue for the king and him personally (en
avauntage nostre Seignur le Roi et le dite William) if he provides suitable statutory
remedy correcting the injustices.262 He further underlines the broader connection
with the welfare of the state that this entails by adding “for him (i.e., Thorntoft) and
the common profit of the realm.”263 It was also something the crown was willing to
repeat back to petitioners in cases where the king deemed their behaviour unreasonable.264 The bishop of Carlisle, (who was trying to claim expenses for nine weeks
spent treating with the Scots on behalf of the king as part of a magnate delegation)
had his claim thrust back at him, but received an interesting response.265 He was
informed that “for the common profit of the king and of the realm and of his see”
he should not travel so far away that he suffers such losses, suggesting that his actions
were not beneficial to the king or the wider community and the onus was on him to
be less extravagant and not spend an unreasonable time away from his diocese.266
The manifestation of this discourse in common petitions (or its perpetuation on
a broader scale) did not seem to hinder its continued employment by individuals and
communities later in the century, though the significant events in the Good Parliament of 1376267 and the reforming zeal of the opening years of Richard II’s reign
may have given rise to (or provide evidence for) a more self-conscious use of the
terminology thereafter.268 The chancellor and scholars of Cambridge, for example,
260

Petitioners: Pelterers of London (SC 8/260/12977) (c.1320–c.1327), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9516921 [https://perma.cc/V5CS-K3R7]
(commun profit de grauntz e le communaute de roaume).
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See, e.g., Petitioners: William de Thorntoft (SC 8/75/3736) (c.1325–c.1350), NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9107510 [https://perma.cc
/9GXF-JPSX].
262
Petitioners: William de Thorntoft (SC 8/75/3738) (c.1325–c.1350), NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9107512 [https://perma.cc/BTU8-J8QV];
SC 8/75/3736, supra note 261.
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SC 8/75/3736, supra note 261 (pur lui e pur comune profist du Realme). In his second
petition “pur dieu” is substituted for “pur lui.” SC 8/75/3738, supra note 262.
264
See, e.g., Petitioners: John de Halton, Bishop of Carlisle (SC 8/103/5117) (c.1321–c.1324),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9149687 [https://perma.cc
/GX2P-L4MP].
265
See id.
266
Id.
267
W. Mark Ormrod, On—and Off—the Record: The Rolls of Parliament, 1337–1377, in
PARCHMENT AND PEOPLE: PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 39, 44 (Linda Clark ed., 2004).
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W. Mark Ormrod, The Good Parliament of 1376: Commons, Communes, and “Common Profit” in Fourteenth-Century English Politics, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
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employ the ‘common profit’ formula in 1379 almost as if it were a yardstick for
appropriate conduct or a synonym for Magna Carta.269 The conduct of the mayor and
bailiffs of the city of Cambridge regarding weights and measures (and their prevention of the University exercising its powers of punishment) is described as “encontre
commune profit” and the University’s request for judicial intervention links the
notion of common profit closely with the common law (selonc les loys de la terre
pur commune profit dicelle).270
During a similar period, the concern of the citizens of Norwich with their
liberties (having obtained an exemplification of a 1377 charter issued to the city of
London and received royal confirmation of their charter in 1378) manifested itself
in the desire to seek an additional clause giving the power to correct defective customs and to ordain and provide remedies in new situations requiring amendment
(which the Londoners had, though it was in reality no more than the ancient custom
to make bylaws).271 The language used in their petition appears to complete a
veritable ‘bingo card’ of supplicatory buzzwords. Not only do they maintain that
their remedies will be for “le bon governement” of the city, they will accord with
“good faith and reason” (bon foye e reson) and be done “for the common profit of
the people” (pur le commune profit del poeple) in a way that will equally be “profitable for the king and his people.”272 Ironically, the petition may well have been
initiated by a more elite group within the city than the language of community
implies, a group who distinguish between themselves and those in the community
(le commune de lour dite ville) who have recently opposed these new measures and
“now seem to be seeking to draw away into their own hands authority which they
had hitherto shared with the whole community in the assembly.”273
Conventions of deference may have meant that it was not deemed appropriate
for ordinary petitioners to be dictating to the king and his council amendments to the
law or the way that the government and legal system operated,274 but where in fact
the subject matter of the petition cited or chimed with Magna Carta, where it was
legitimately and justifiably of concern because it contravened the Great Charter, its
use may have added authority and rhetorical power to their complaint. This overtly
HISTORY AND HISTORIANS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF BRYCE LYON (1920–2007) 169, 169–88
(David Nicholas et al. eds., 2012); Ormrod, supra note 240, at 246–47.
269
Ormrod, supra note 240, at 247.
270
Petitioners: Chancellor and Scholars of Cambridge University (SC 8/19/913) (1379),
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061066 [https://perma
.cc/7AF2-2542].
271
2 THE RECORDS OF THE CITY OF NORWICH liv–lv (William Hudson & John C. Tingey
eds., 1910).
272
Petitioners: Citizens of Norwich (SC 8/18/892) (1378), NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discov
ery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9061045 [https://perma.cc/HX3S-4LHN] (profitables
pur le Roi nostre Seignur e pur son poeple).
273
THE RECORDS OF THE CITY OF NORWICH, supra note 271, at lv.
274
Ormrod, supra note 240, at 229–30.
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‘political’ language (employing official constructs frequently asserted by the crown)
gained currency outside the formal environment of chancery and parliament through
its interpolation by provincial lawyers, civic clerks and scriveners in supplications
to the crown from individuals and communities.275 Indeed, Parliamentary attendance
by men of law and in particular, city recorders (an office that many towns and cities
were adopting and in turn was becoming an increasingly attractive position for
lawyers), may also explain both the assertiveness and choice of language employed
in petitions by civic communities.276 It was thus already part of the language of complaint (and as such it was repeated back to crown) before its adoption by the parliamentary commons, who by the mid-fourteenth century were themselves recognised
as the moral arbiters of public welfare.277
CONCLUSION
Predominantly it has been the political and constitutional aspects of Magna
Carta that have interested historians of the fourteenth century. In spite of its obvious
symbolic authority as a benchmark of royal behaviour and its use to legitimise
actions on the political stage, the Great Charter nevertheless maintained a strong
presence in the realm of private disputes.278 The crown’s encouragement of complaints from its subjects fostered the construction of petitions citing Magna Carta or
drawing on the language of its provisions.279 Indeed, the Great Charter’s influence
on the flow and nature of complaints submitted to the crown concerning the exercise
of royal justice should not be underestimated. These grievances centred on issues
regarding deprivation of freedoms and privileges, and unfair or unreasonable treatment by those wielding authority (whether in financial, physical, or property-related
terms).280 Significantly, they also concerned perceptions of unjustness and experience of illegality arising from the operation or improper application of the legal
processes themselves.281
Historians have recognised that even by Henry III’s reign many of the substantive provisions of Magna Carta were outdated, implying the Great Charter did not
play as significant a role in the lives of fourteenth-century people as it had done in
earlier generations.282 The private petitions and reported cases, however, reveal that
275

MUSSON, supra note 63, at 226–30, 254.
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this was not necessarily the case.283 While many of the clauses of the original Magna
Carta were no longer relevant (or as relevant),284 litigants were quite content to include Magna Carta with their citation of other statutes or align its clauses with later
amendments.285 Sometimes they were inventive in their legal arguments or pushed
the boundaries of the original meaning.286 At other times they futilely harnessed it
to their cause and betray their own misconceptions or misunderstanding of the law.287
This in turn makes it possible to gauge contemporaries’ respective attitudes towards
it as ‘law’ and the extent to which it was embedded in the psyche or legal consciousness of fourteenth-century men and women.
The question is then why does Magna Carta have this power and at this particular point in time? From 1297 onwards, Magna Carta was acknowledged to be an
intrinsic part of the law of the land.288 This combined with the concept of ‘time out
of mind’289 fostered notions of the tradition and timelessness of the common law that
the Great Charter had come to represent.290 In symbolic terms Magna Carta provided
a superior reference point (akin to divine law) and ordinary litigants placed faith in it
or its principles (governed by right and reason) as an unimpeachable higher authority.291
The abstract principles enshrined in the Great Charter were infused with Roman/
canon law and were themselves embodied in the king’s coronation oath.292 It was the
monarch’s duty to provide for his subjects access to his justice and remedy abuse of
legal process. Moreover, the language employed in certain petitions demonstrates
reliance on the promise of amendment contained in the text of Magna Carta.293
Drawing on a specific formula cited from the preamble294 it yokes application of the
law and judicial processes to notions of common enterprise, yielding economic, social,
and political advantage and mutual benefit to the crown and people.295
Reference to Magna Carta and its ideals, observable at all levels of society, can
be regarded as reflecting the spread of information about the Great Charter, including dissemination in statute books and its regular proclamation in the shires and
towns. Against this backdrop should be set a judicial system that in the thirteenth
283
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and fourteenth centuries was evolving not just to meet royal requirements in dispelling problems of public order and enforcing penalties against criminal behaviour,296
but also to meet the needs of growing numbers of private suits brought by a litigious
population at the encouragement of a burgeoning legal profession.297 The fostering
of such expectations can be seen in the way customary tenants (especially those claiming ancient demesne status) who felt they were being treated unjustly by manorial
lords to bring their plight to the attention of the crown.298
Invocation of Magna Carta in petitions and litigation can also be considered as
reflecting the availability of and confidence in clerks and local men of law. Whether
this confidence in citing its authority (either verbatim, in paraphrase or simply by
name) derived from ordinary litigants’ knowledge and expectations of the Great
Charter, from familiarity with its citation in parliamentary business or as a result of
the encouragement and influence of the legal profession would be a difficult distinction to draw. The answer probably lies in a mixture of all three.
As demonstrated by continued citation in private petitions and its deployment
in litigation,299 the Great Charter maintained its power and authority throughout the
fourteenth century, not just in the public sphere (with the treason trials and the
deposition articles of Richard II), but in the private legal domain too. The more
prosaic invocation of the Great Charter by individuals and communities in petitions
and litigation therefore provides a parallel world in which it operated and an understandable context for the parliamentary commons’ desire for its formal reconfirmation in legislation with the ensuing constitutional ramifications.300
Even if the situation in high politics altered over the course of the fifteenth
century and constitutional interest in Magna Carta waned,301 its significance to local
society and the legal profession did not markedly decline.302 Indeed, in relation to
the latter, it remained an important element of the lectures and moots of the Inns of
Court into the sixteenth century and beyond.303 Although the numbers of private
petitions to the crown may have reduced over the course of the fifteenth century,304
296
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the evolution of the chancellor’s ‘court of conscience’ in the same period did much
to cater for the needs of those who had previously personally petitioned the crown
for wrongs and injustices that they felt could not be remedied in the ordinary law
courts.305 Paradoxically, Magna Carta became less overtly visible as its principles
became absorbed into the fabric of the legal system and supplementary legislation
elaborated on its substantive clauses.306 If its effect was temporarily diminished
during the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it is the long fourteenth century in
both legal and political arenas, that Magna Carta’s lasting contribution to law and
justice was firmly established.
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